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We report on a simple experiment which enables us to infer how far people plan ahead when taking 
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How Far Ahead Do People Plan? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Economic theory assumes that people, when taking dynamic decisions, plan right to the 
planning horizon. Evidence that this might not be so comes from previous experimental 
investigations (for example, Bone at al (2003), Carbone and Hey (2001) and Hey (2002)), but the 
inferences from these have been clouded by doubts concerning the preference functions of the 
subjects in the experiments. We present here the results from a simple experiment which requires 
only the assumption that preferences satisfy monotonicity and therefore do not violate dominance. 
This requires a particular design, which we discuss in the next section. We then report on the results 
from the experiment which suggests that only slightly more than half of the subjects actually do 
plan to the planning horizon. On the contrary, a little less than a half do not. We speculate on the 
implications in the concluding section. 
 
The Experimental Design 
We represent dynamic decision problems in the form of a tree. We use in this experiment 
what we call 3+3 trees. These have three decision nodes interleaved with three chance nodes. The 
tree starts with a decision node, and subsequently decision nodes are followed by chance nodes and 
vice versa. After the third chance nodes, there are payoff nodes. In the payoff nodes there are 
amounts of money which the subject is paid if he or she reaches that node. An example is shown in 
Figure 1, in which the subject starts at the bottom and works up through the tree to one of the payoff 
nodes at the top. At each decision node, there are just two possible decisions – Left or Right. At 
each chance node, there are just two possible moves – by ‘Nature’ – Left or Right. Subjects are told 
that Nature moves Left and Right with equal probability and that all moves are independent of each 
other and of the moves by the subject. Even in this simple 3+3 tree branches and payoff nodes 
proliferate – so that there are 64 of the latter. Each of these contains a payoff denominated in 
money. 
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The structure of the payoffs in these nodes is central to the design of the experiment. We 
built the 3+3 trees used in the experiment from 2+2 trees with what we call the dominance property. 
A 2+2 tree is simply a tree with two decision nodes interleaved with two chance nodes; it has 16 
payoff nodes. A 3+3 tree is obtained by combining four 2+2 trees. The dominance property is as 
follows, where we denote the payoffs in a 2+2 tree by xi i = 1,..,16.  The payoffs satisfy the 
following conditions, where by (y1, y2,…,yn) >  (z1, z2,…,zn) we mean that yi ≥ zi for i = 1,…,n and 
that there is at least one i for which yi > zi. 
1. (x1,x2) > (x3,x4)   
2. (x5,x6) > (x7,x8)    
3. (x9,x10) > (x11,x12)    
4. (x13,x14) > (x15,x16) 
5. (x1,x2,x5,x6)  > (x9,x10,x11,x12) 
6.  (x9,x10,x11,x12,x13,x14,x15,x16)  > (x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7,x8) 
In a 2+2 tree there is one decision node at the first decision level and four at the second. Conditions 
1 through 4 imply that Left is the best decision (for a subject whose preferences satisfy dominance) 
at each of the four second-level decision nodes. Condition 5 implies that Left therefore is the best 
decision at the first decision node for a subject whose preferences satisfy dominance and who plans 
ahead – thereby eliminating from the tree those payoff nodes that he or she knows will not be 
reached because of the decisions that will be made at the second level. Condition 6 implies that, for 
a subject who does not eliminate these payoff nodes, and thus thinks myopically about the 
implications of the decision at the first level, will choose Right at the first decision node. So one 
route through the tree (always play Left) is best for a subject who plans ahead while another (Right 
at the first level and Left at any of the second) appears best for a subject who does not plan ahead.  
We construct our 3+3 trees from four different 2+2 trees with this dominance property. Moreover, 
we do it in such a way that (1) one route through the tree – LLL – is best for subjects who think two 
moves ahead (right to the end of the tree), (2) another route through the tree – RLL – appears best 
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for those subjects who plan just one move ahead; and (3) a third route through the tree – RRL – 
appears  best for those subjects who do not think ahead at all. Such a 3+3 tree has once again what 
we call the dominance property2. We then randomise so that the respective routes through the tree 
are not the same for all subjects3. Because of this randomisation, we use from now on the notation 
+++ to indicate the route chosen by the fully-planning-ahead person, −++ the route chosen by a 
subject planning one move ahead and by −−+ the route chosen by a person not planning ahead. 92 
subjects took part in the experiment in two separate treatments – Treatment 1 in which the 
dominance at the first level was strong and Treatment 2 where the dominance was weak, in that 
either decision at the first decision level was optimal for the person fully planning ahead4. Usual 
experimental protocols were observed and the subjects paid accordingly5. Subjects were allowed 
four different attempts at the same decision tree. 
 
Results 
 We fit the following model6 to the data. We assume that a proportion p1 of the subjects do 
not plan ahead at all, a proportion p2 plan ahead just one period, and a proportion p3 plan ahead two 
periods. In order to account for other responses, and to allow for the usual phenomenon that 
subjects make mistakes when performing the experiment, we allow for trembles at each decision 
level. Specifically we assume tremble probabilities of ti  at decision level i =1,2,3. So at decision 
level i the subject implements the intended decision with probability (1-ti) and implements the 
unintended decision with probability ti. Thus we get Table 1 for treatment 1, and Table 2 for 
treatment 2. Let us denote by Fij the frequency of outcome labelled ij in Tables 1 and 2. We 
estimate p1, p2, p3, t1, t2 and t3 to minimise the sum of squared differences between the observed 
                                                 
2 We can provide more formal statements of this property on request. 
3 Obviously the property is retained that one route through the tree is best for those who plan two moves ahead, a 
second appears best for those who plan just one move ahead and a third appears best for those who do not plan ahead at 
all. 
4 Note, of course, that they had to do the planning ahead to realise this. 
5 The written Instructions are attached as an Appendix. Full details of the experimental implementation are available on 
request. 
6 We should note that we have fitted a variety of other models to the data (specifically (1) with a constant tremble 
probability and (2) with a tremble probability that varies across types of subject rather than across the decision levels) 
but this formulation fits the data significantly better than the other formulations. 
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frequencies and those implied by Tables 1 and 2 – that is 
8 4
2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1
( ) ( )j j j j
j j
F np F np
= =
− + −∑ ∑ . We use 
GAUSS to calculate the estimated parameters.  
The estimated probabilities are p1 = 0.41710, p2 = 0.00046 and p3 = 0.58244. The estimated 
trembles are t1 = 0.09919, t2 = 0.28995 and t3 = 0.10866. The actual and fitted frequencies of the 
various outcomes are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The model seems to fit the data rather well. 
 The results suggest that some 41.7% of the subjects do not plan ahead at all, some 58.2% 
plan ahead to the planning horizon (as they should according to economic theory), while almost no-
one plans ahead just one period. The conclusion is that the subjects neatly bifurcate into two groups 
– the planners and the non-planners. The tremble probabilities are interesting – with very small 
trembles at the first  and third decision levels and a rather large tremble at the second decision level. 
It would seem that the planners almost completely implement their plan while the non-planners 
have considerable difficulty in implementing any kind of decision rule.  
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion is straightforward, though we had hoped for greater richness in the data. 
There are two types of people out there: those who plan completely ahead and implement their 
plans almost perfectly, and those who do not plan and indeed have difficulty in implementing any 
kind of rule. If the same bifurcation is the case generally, then we get the kind of story that is often 
told in the economics literature – two kinds of agent: naïve and sophisticated. The implications of 
this have already been explored. This paper gives some evidence that it is a realistic story.   
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Table 1: the probabilities of the various paths through the tree (treatment 1) 
 
Prob. Outcome Implied by the model 
p11 +++ p1 t1 t2 (1-t3) + p2 t1 (1-t2) (1-t3) + p3(1-t1) (1-t2) (1-t3) 
p12 −++ p1 (1-t1) t2 (1-t3) + p2(1-t1) (1-t2) (1-t3) + p3 t1 (1-t2) (1-t3) 
p13 +−+ p1 t1 (1-t2) (1-t3) + p2 t1 t2 (1-t3) + p3(1-t1) t2 (1-t3) 
p14 ++− p1 t1t2t3  + p2 t1 (1-t2) t3 + p3(1-t1) (1-t2) t3 
p15 −−+ p1(1-t1) (1-t2) (1-t3) + p2(1-t1) t2 (1-t3) + p3 t1 t2 (1-t3) 
p16 −+− p1(1-t1) t2 t3 + p2(1-t1) (1-t2) t3 + p3 t1 (1-t2) t3 
p17 +−− p1 t1 (1-t2) t3 + p2 t1t2t3 + p3(1-t1) t2 t3 
p18 −−− p1(1-t1) (1-t2) t3 + p2(1-t1) t2 t3 + p3 t1t2t3 
 
 
Table 2: the probabilities of the various paths through the tree (treatment 2) 
 
Prob. Outcome Implied by the model 
p21 *++ p1 t2 (1-t3) + (p2+  p3)(1-t2) (1-t3) 
p22 *−+ p1(1-t2) (1-t3) + (p2+  p3)t2 (1-t3) 
p23 *+− p1t2t3  + (p2+  p3)(1-t2) t3 
p24 *−− p1(1-t2) t3 + (p2+  p3)t2t3 
 
 
Table 3: the observed and predicted frequencies (treatment 1) 
 
Outcome Observed frequency Predicted frequency 
+++ 65 63 
−++ 26 25 
+−+ 27 30 
++− 3 8 
−−+ 44 47 
−+− 3 3 
+−− 8 4 
−−− 8 6 
 
 
Table 4:  the observed and predicted frequencies (treatment 2) 
 
Outcome Observed frequency Predicted frequency 
*++ 86 88 
*−+ 78 76 
*+− 10 11 
*−− 10 9 
 8
Figure 1: A 3+3 decision tree 
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Appendix: The experimental instructions NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment. It is an experiment on the economics of dynamic decision 
making under risk. The Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (ESRC) has provided the 
funds to finance this research. The instructions are straightforward, and if you follow them carefully 
you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash immediately after 
the end of the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully and take as much time as you need. 
There are no right or wrong ways to complete the experiment, but what you do will have 
implications for what you are paid at the end of the experiment. There is no participation fee for this 
experiment – what you are paid at the end depends partly on the decisions that you take during the 
experiment and partly on chance. 
 
 
Your Various Attempts at the Experiment 
 
 You will be allowed a number of attempts at the experiment. The actual number will be told 
to you when you start the experiment. On each attempt at the experiment, there will be a payoff. 
Your payment for the experiment will be a randomly chosen one of these payoffs. We give more 
detail below. Each attempt will involve working your way through a decision tree – which we 
describe below. 
 
 
The Decision Tree 
 
 The experiment concerns a Decision Tree which is composed of a sequence of choice and 
chance nodes. At each node there are two subsequent paths to follow: Left and Right. At each 
choice node you will have to take a decision - in each case whether to go Left or Right. At each 
chance node a chance device - which we call Nature - will determine whether Left or Right is 
chosen.  Nature operates in a totally random way – so that Left and Right are equally likely and 
independent of any past moves by either you or Nature. In total there are three choice nodes and 
three chance nodes, starting with a choice node and then alternating the two types until the final 
chance node. So the entire sequence is: choice, chance, choice, chance, choice, chance. After the 
third and final chance node is played out you will arrive at an end node. Each end node has 
associated with it a payoff - a certain amount of money which is your payoff for that attempt if you 
arrive at that end node. To discover the payoff associated with any particular end node you should 
click on that node - using your mouse. The payoff associated with that node will be written in the 
box at the top of the screen. 
 
 
Nature 
 
 ‘Nature’ is our way of describing a totally random device. It is important that you 
understand what this means. At any chance node, when Nature moves, it moves in such a way that 
Left or Right are equally likely and independent of any moves made by you or by Nature at any 
time. This means that it is impossible to predict what Nature is going to do and the only information 
on which you can work is simply that Left and Right are equally likely. It may be useful to you to 
note that the way that Nature is implemented on the computer is through using the random number 
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generating software of the computer. Even with this knowledge you are unable to predict any move 
of Nature. 
 
 
Notepads 
 
 All nodes, except the final payoff nodes, have associated Notepads which can be opened by 
clicking on that node with your mouse. Once open, you can leave notes in the Notepad for future 
reference. These Notepads may prove useful to you as places to keep notes to help you in deciding 
what to do as you move through the tree. Indeed, since we will not allow you to use paper and 
pencil nor to take any other notes during the experiment, the use of these Notepads is the only way 
you can take and keep notes to help you in your decision making. You can use these Notepads as 
much or as little as you wish. The information that you put in the Notepads will remain there 
(unless you edit it or delete it) throughout all attempts at the experiment. 
 
 
More Details 
 
 You should read these instructions carefully, and then turn to the computer. You will first be 
shown a PowerPoint presentation of these Instructions. Then the main program for the experiment 
will be run. You will first be told how many attempts at the experiment you will be allowed. The 
program will then proceed to the main screen. This contains the decision tree: starting at the bottom 
with a single highlighted (white) choice node, and then proceeding upwards through a level 
containing 2 chance nodes (red squares); then to a level containing 4 choice nodes (green squares); 
then to a level containing 8 chance nodes (red squares); then to a level containing 16 choice nodes 
(green squares); then to a level containing 32 chance nodes (red squares); and finally to the top level 
containing 64 end nodes (yellow squares). See the figure attached to these instructions for a 
preview. On each attempt at the tree, you will ultimately move up through the tree until you reach 
one of the end nodes; which end node you end up at will determine your payoff for that attempt.  At 
each choice node you come to, you will eventually have to decide whether to go Left or Right; at 
each chance node you come to, Nature will choose whether you go Left or Right. As we have 
already remarked, Nature choose at random so that Left and Right are equally likely and 
independent of any past moves. So the final end node you end up at depends partly on your choices 
and partly on chance. 
 
 
Looking at Specific Nodes 
 
 On any attempt, and at any stage in the whole process, either before taking any choices or 
playing out any chance nodes, or after taking one or more choices or after playing out one or more 
chance nodes, you can explore the tree and leave notes in the Notepads associated with any node.  
This is simply done by clicking on that node with your mouse. You will notice that when you click 
on any node, it turns white. Moreover, if it is a payoff node, the payoff associated with that node is 
shown in the box at the top of the screen; whereas if it is a choice or a chance node, the Notepad 
associated with that node opens. 
 
 
Examining the Notepads 
 
 Once you click on a choice or chance node, the node turns white, and the associated 
Notepad opens and you can read its contents. You can then add to or amend the contents of the 
Notepad simply by typing in the usual fashion. To then close the Notepad you click on the key “If 
 11
you want to close and save the Notepad click here”. As we have already remarked, the information 
that you put in the Notepads will remain there (unless you edit it or delete it) throughout all attempts 
at the experiment. 
 
 
Making Moves 
 
 To make a move at the current node, click on that node and, in addition to the Notepad, a 
box will open telling you what to do. If the current node is a choice node, then there will be a box 
with “Are you ready to decide?” at the top. If you are ready, then click on “Move Left” or “Move 
Right” as you wish, and then click on “Click here to confirm your decision”. If the current node is a 
chance node, then there will be a box with “It is Nature’s move” at the top. If you are ready for 
Nature to move, then click in the button “Click here when you are ready for Nature to move”. As 
we have already remarked, Nature chooses at random so that Left and Right are equally likely and 
independent of any past moves.  Please note that you or Nature can make moves only at the current 
node: you if the current node is a choice node and Nature if the current node is a chance node. You 
should also note that when you or Nature makes a move, then the half of the remaining tree that is 
excluded by your or Nature’s move turns grey – indicating that that half is no longer available. 
 
 
Payoffs 
 
 The payoff for the tree is the payoff in the final end node. This will be shown at the top of 
the screen when you reach that final end node on any one attempt. When you have completed all 
allowable attempts there will be a message at the top of the screen telling you the payoff on each of 
the attempts that you have completed. At this stage you should call one of the experimenters. He or 
she will ask you to complete a brief questionnaire and will pay you the final payment. How this is 
determined is explained below. You will be asked to sign a receipt for the payment. 
 
 
Your Payment for Participating in the Experiment 
 
 As we have already remarked, you will be allowed several attempts at the tree. The precise 
number of attempts will be told to you when you start the experiment, and you will be reminded 
throughout of how many attempts you have done and how many remain to be done. On each 
attempt there will be a payoff, denominated in money. Your payment for the experiment will be a 
randomly chosen one of these payoffs. For example, suppose you are allowed 4 attempts at the tree. 
There will be 4 payoffs – one for each attempt. At the end of the experiment, you will be invited to 
call over one of the experimenters. He or she will have 4 cards, numbered from 1 to 4. These cards 
will be shuffled and you will be invited to pick one of the cards (obviously without seeing the 
number written on it). The number on the card that you pick will be noted and you will be paid the 
payoff on that numbered attempt. 
 
 
Other 
 
 If there is any aspect of these instructions about which you are not clear, please ask the 
Experimenter. It is clearly in your interests to understand these instructions as fully as possible. 
Please also feel free to call the Experimenter at any time. 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
